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The purpose of this paper is to examine how insurance brokers control opportunism at the postcontractual stage of insurance contract in the Nigerian insurance market. Such opportunism, widely reported of insurance commercial customers, threatens the survival of the entire insurance institution while brokers' role is grossly ignored.

The paper involved the use of semi‐structured interviews of insurance broking executives and documentary analyses of how insurance brokers gather and pass on information between clients and insurers to control opportunism in the insurance market.

Findings suggest that the involvement of the insurance brokers from the claim notification stage, claim auditing to actual settlement and dispute mediation are instances of control over customers' opportunistic tendencies. Also, it is found that fear of reputation damage and brokers' professional way of handling clients' over‐exaggeration and suspicious claiming might considerably control insurance opportunism.

Involving insurance brokers in the claim settlement stage is capable of reducing insurers' claim auditing costs while guaranteeing hassle‐free claiming experience for customers and boosting the image of the insurance industry. Hence, findings are relevant for insurance companies and regulators desirous of controlling opportunism in the insurance market.

The paper extends the marketing role of brokers to the claim settlement stage by highlighting their potentials to control clients' opportunistic behaviours which threaten the insurance market.

Insurance fraud as a global economic problem threatens the financial strength of insurers and threatens the survival of the insurance institution. The purpose of this paper is to explore the magnitude of the problem including the industry's and regulatory authority's responses in tackling the menace in Nigeria. The paper is motivated by the recent effort on the part of the Nigerian regulatory authority to strengthen the sector through consolidation. Such renewed vigour on part of Nigeria is geared towards fighting all forms of economic crimes in both public and private sectors in post‐military years.

The paper reviews the literature on the existing fraud control mechanisms, i.e. insurance contract design and auditing and the perception of fraud by customers in the insurance market. A survey is conducted by interview method to explore the size of the problem and the effectiveness of the approach the industry and its regulator are adopting to control it.

The paper's findings suggest a lukewarm or no serious attitude on the part of the regulatory authority and the insurance companies in appreciating the enormity of the problem now and in the future. This stems from lack of clear‐cut sanctions for offenders and mechanism for enforcement.

The paper reveals the paucity of research of such a topical issue in developing economies and suggests the need for urgent stakeholders' summit that will discuss effects of insurance fraud on the industry with a view to identifying specific roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder group in tackling the problem. This should also be complimented with the establishment of insurance fraud bureau that would promote public awareness campaign on the evil effect of fraud on the economy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine brokers' financial incentives in the Nigerian insurance market and how they balance conflict of interest which their role engenders. The paper aims to assess how these affect the control of opportunism of customers in the Nigerian insurance market.

The study involved the use of semi‐structured interviews of insurance broking executives and documentary analyses of how incentives aid the control of opportunism in the insurance market.

Findings suggest that the Nigerian insurance market operates on highly tariff incentive system which might be hampering insurance brokers' role in bridging information asymmetries to control opportunism in the market. Conflicts of interest are also real in the insurance market.

Findings are relevant for practitioners and regulators in addressing the restrictive remuneration system which calls for liberalisation to encourage the control of opportunism in the insurance market.

The study underscores how financial incentives might be utilised to balance conflict of interest which insurance intermediation engenders.